Michigan Law Review
Volume 51

Issue 4

1953

LEGISLATION-MICHIGAN VETERANS' RE-EMPLOYMENT ACT
William Andrew Bain, Jr. S.Ed.
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons, Legislation Commons, Military, War, and Peace
Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons

Recommended Citation
William A. Bain, Jr. S.Ed., LEGISLATION-MICHIGAN VETERANS' RE-EMPLOYMENT ACT, 51 MICH. L. REV.
607 (1953).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol51/iss4/18

This Regular Feature is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

1953]

RECENT DECISIONS

607

LBc1SLATION-MicmcAN VETERANS' RE-EMPLOYMENT Acrr-A recent Michigan statute1 provides for the re-employment of former employees2 of the state
or the subdivisions thereof who left their positions, voluntarily or involuntarily,
for service in the armed forces of the United States and have been honorably
discharged. No opinion as to the interpretation or effect of the statute has
been rendered by the Michigan courts or by any official state agency, but an
examination of the very similar federal statute,3 and the litigation which it
has fostered, indicates that a number of problems may arise. An insight into
some typical problems and their possible solutions may be obtained from an
examination of the federal decisions.
The primary purpose of the statute is to insure that the returning veteran
will not be retarded in his civilian occupation because of his absence on military
duty and, therefore, it will be interpreted liberally in his favor. 4 However, the
language of the statute will be given its ordinary and usual meaningi and will
not be construed to put the veteran in a more favorable position than he would
have been in if he had not entered the service.6 The provisions of the federal
act are mandatory7 and give the returning veteran a right to be restored to his
· former position, or to a position of like seniority, status and pay, for a period ·
of one year, provided he is still qualified, the position still exists, and it is
feasible to re-employ him.8 Under the federal act, the employer may restore
the veteran to his former position or to a position of like seniority, status and
pay at his option,0 but a different result may obtain under the Michigan act.
The Michigan act provides that the veteran shall ''be restored to such position
if it exists and is not held by a person with greater seniority, otherwise to a
position of like seniority, status and pay.''10 The use of the mandatory word
"shall," and the conditions imposed, that is, if the position exists and is not held

Acts (1951) No. 263; Mich. Stat. Ann. (Cum. Supp. 1951) §4.1486.
would appear to apply to civil service and non-civil service employees.
a 62 Stat. L. (1949) 604, as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. (Supp. V, 1952) §459.
4 Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock and Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 66 S.Ct. ll05
(1946); Kay v. General Cable Corp., (3d Cir. 1944) 144 F. (2d) 653.
5 McCarthy v. M. and M. Transp. Co., (1st Cir. 1947) 160 F. (2d) 322.
6 Meehan v. National Supply Co., (10th Cir. 1947) 160 F. (2d) 346; Siaskiewicz
v. General Electric Co., (2d Cir. 1948) 166 F. (2d) 463; Congregation of Brothers of St.
Francis Xavier v. Grone, (6th Cir. 1947) 164 F. (2d) 689.
7 Hilton v. Sullivan, 334 U.S. 323, 68 S.Ct. 1020 (1948).
s 50 U.S.C. App. (Supp. V, 1952) §459(b)(c)(e).
9 Major v. Phillips-Jones Corp., (2d Cir. 1951) 192 F. (2d) 186; cert. den. 343 U.S.
927, 72 S.Ct. 760 (1952); Bova v. Genexal Mills, (6th Cir. 1949) 173 F. (2d) 138.
10 Mich. Stat. Ann. (Cum. Supp. 1951) §4.1486(2). (Italics added).
1 Mich. Pub.
2 The statute
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by a person of greater seniority, would allow a :finding that the veteran is
entitled to his old position unless these conditions are present. Further, the use
of "otherwise," as contrasted with the use of "or" in the federal act, would make
it more difficult to find that the old position and the position of like seniority,
status and pay were intended as alternatives. However, the Michigan act does
provide in another section that where it is not feasible to restore the veteran
to a position in a certain department or agency, he shall be appointed to a
position for which he is qualified in another department or agency, if such
position is vacant or is held by a person with less seniority.11 While this provision would appear to be in conflict with the foregoing provisions, it seems
likely that it is intended to cover cases where the public employer has undergone a change of circumstances such that re-employment of the veteran in the
same position or a similar position is not feasible. The provision would cover
cases where economic or other conditions necessitated a reduction of force so
that the position was abolished. In such a case, it would not appear that the
employer should create a useless position just because the former incumbent
was a veteran.12 But a mere loss of efficiency or ·increase in the cost of operation, 13 or a desire to continue the present employee in the position due to a more
harmonious employer-employee relationship,14 would not generally be such a
change of circumstances.- Where a veteran is re-empl<;>yed, he does not acquire
a super-seniority, but is placed in the same position with relation to his fellow
employees as if he had never been absent:1 5 Although he is entitled to all
benefits which accrue because of his accumulated seniority, he is not entitled
to those benefits which require actual on-the-job experience.16 Under the
Michigan act, the veteran may not be discharged without cause for a period
of one year,17 but, if the act is interpreted as the federal act has been, he is
subject to the same rules and discipline as other employees and may be discharged
for a violation. 18 In the case where the former position no longer exists or is
held by a person of greater seniority, the question arises as to the meaning of
"like seniority, status and pay." The federal decisions indicate that no special
connotation is given these terms; therefore, if the veteran is given a position
substantially similar in opportunity, skills, pay and seniority to that which
he would have had if he had not been absent, tl_ie requirements of the act will
be satisfied.19 Again, he would not be entitled to benefits which require on11 Mich. Stat. Ann. (Cum. Supp. 1951) §4.1486(2)b2. Although there is a similar
provision in the federal act, 50 U.S.C. App. (Supp. V, 1952) §459(e)IB, there apparently has been no litigation involving it.
12 Ruesterholtz v. TiteHex, Inc., (3d Cir. 1948) 166 F. (2d) 335.
13 Van Doren v. Van Doren Laundry Service, (3d Cir. 1947) 162 F. (2d) 1007.
14 Kay v. General Cable Co., supra note 4.
15 Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock and ;Repair Co., supra note 4.
16 Altgens v. The Associated Press, (5th Cir. 1951) 188 F. (2d) 727.
11 Mich. Stat. Ann. (Cum. Supp. 1951) §4.1486(3).
18 Manowitz v. Einhorn Wholesale Grocery, (D.C. N.Y. 1946) 68 F. Supp. 907.
19 Bowen v. Home Beneficial Life Ins. Co., ( 4th Cir. 1950) 183 F. (2d) 376; Bova
v. General Mills, supra note 9; Schwetzler v. Midwest Dairy Products Corp., (7th Cir.
1949) 174 F. (2d) 612.
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the-job experience.20 Despite the mandatory character of the act and the
liberal interpretation it is accorded, it is quite probable that all benefits could be
waived, in the absence of fraud,21 by an acceptance without reservation of a
different position22 or the same position at less pay.23 While this analysis is
clearly not authoritative because of the complete absence of Michigan authority,
it does indicate the course which has been followed by the federal courts and
it is possible that the Michigan court, when faced with similar problems, may
arrive at the same conclusions.
William Andrew Bain, Jr., S.Ed.

20 Altgens
21 Loeb v.

v. The Associated Press, supra note 16.
Kivo, (2d Cir. 1948) 169 F. (2d) 346, cert. den. 335 U.S. 891, 69 S.Ct.

246 (1948).
22 Walsh v. Chicago Bridge and hon Co., (D.C. ill. 1949) 90 F. Supp. 322.
23 But it is probably required that there be an express waiver of the benefits of the act.
Loeb v. Kivo, supra note 21.

